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In the absence of strong U.S. national climate change policy, California and New York,
among other states, adopted relatively comprehensive and ambitious policies to cut greenhouse gas
emissions during the 2000s. They adopted these policies despite political-institutional and other
structural barriers similar to those found nationally, which shows that political actors have
significant scope for taking effective action even under structural constraints. This article explains
the adoption of climate policies in these two leading states by using a windows of opportunity
approach, which analyzes how the convergence of problem and political events produces policy
windows and hence opportunities for advocacy coalitions to mobilize successfully for the adoption
of major policies. It uses this framework to explain four episodes of state-level climate policy
adoption, including: motor vehicle emissions and renewable energy policy in California (2002);
emissions reduction targets, a low-carbon fuel standard, and emissions trading in California (2006-
2008); a renewable portfolio standard and emissions trading in New York (2002-2003); and an
energy efficiency standard and stricter renewable portfolio standard in New York (2007-2010). The
convergence of problem and political events, including scientific reports, focusing events, election
results, political leadership, and interest-group mobilization, led to these bursts of innovation,
which helped to overcome structural barriers to climate policy adoption.
INTRODUCTION
The United States’ federal climate change mitigation policies are widely seen as weak and
ineffective, especially in cross-national comparison.1 Before the Obama administration, these
policies were limited mainly to voluntary measures and were not guided by overall emissions
reduction targets. Partly as a result, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions increased by 10.4 percent from
1990 to 2010.2 But in the absence of strong national action, many state governments adopted
climate policies beginning in the early 2000s.  The main policies include: greenhouse gas emissions
targets and climate action plans; support for energy efficiency improvements and renewable energy
development; energy efficiency and CO2 emissions standards for vehicles, appliances, buildings,
and power plants; and mandatory cap-and-trade systems for greenhouse gases.3 The governments of
about a dozen states, clustered in the Northeast and on the West Coast, have adopted relatively
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strong climate policies. That is, they have ambitious goals, have pursued a very wide range of
policies, started policy making earlier than other states, and have made reasonable progress in
implementation.4
This article focuses on two states, California and New York, chosen because they are
among those with the strongest climate policies in the United States, have led other states in their
regions, and are large, important entities in their own rights. Of the two, California clearly has the
stronger policies; it is the only state with emissions reduction targets that are simultaneously
economy-wide in their scope, ambitious, and legally binding.5
Why have California and New York adopted relatively strong climate policies? Why are
California’s policies outstanding? This article, which is drawn from a recent book,6 addresses these
empirical questions in the context of a range of theories drawn from literatures on climate and other
environmental policies. These literatures, surprisingly, bifurcate between structural and process
theories.  As described in the theoretical section below, one body of work focuses only on structural
explanations, and hence implies that institutions and other structures are determining and that actors
and processes do not matter; a different body of scholarship focuses only on actors and processes,
and hence implies that those are adequate, and that structural constraints do not matter.  Hence,
taken as a whole, these literatures contains an implicit debate about how much “room for
maneuver,”7 or scope for effective action, political actors have, and yet the implicitness of the
debate means that this overarching theoretical question is left unaddressed.
Therefore, while answering this article’s empirical questions, I also aim to delineate the
room to maneuver that political actors have in cases of climate policy adoption in the United States.
 I will do this by assessing the usefulness of both structural and process theories for explaining
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policy adoption in California and New York. In the above-mentioned book, I tried to give equal
attention to both sets of theories, but for reasons of space, this article mainly will make the case for
process theories of climate policy adoption, and for the windows of opportunity theory as a
representative of those process theories. Although the structural accounts are useful for helping to
explain inaction by the U.S. federal government, they go too far in implying that structural barriers
make climate change policy impossible in the United States; in particular, they cannot explain the
adoption of climate policies by some states. I will argue that even under serious structural
constraints, when the right kinds of events converge, actors have opportunities to gain the
adoption of strong climate policies. At the same time, certain structural advantages in California
and New York also contributed to the outcomes there, a consideration to which I will return in
the conclusions.
I will be using the California and New York cases for two kinds of comparison:   a
universalizing comparison, seeking to identify what they have in common that could account for
the similarities in their outcomes; and a variation-finding comparison, aiming to explain why
California’s policies are stronger than New York’s.8 For reasons of space, I will not be able to
discuss other states that have relatively strong climate policies, such as Massachusetts, to explain
why certain policies have been adopted rather than others (such as emissions trading rather than
carbon taxes), or to provide a full account of why California is the pre-eminent example of state-
level climate policy. However, in the conclusions, I will discuss some additional reasons for that
state’s exceptional policies.
In the next four brief sections, I discuss the theoretical issues, explain why I chose
California and New York, describe their climate policies, and assess how well several of the main
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structural theories can explain those two states’ policies. Then the article analyzes four episodes of
climate policy adoption in these two states by using the windows of opportunity theory. I conclude
by summarizing the empirical findings in terms of the theories considered, explaining why
California’s policies are stronger than New York State’s, considering some additional alternative
explanations, and discussing the implications for theories of climate policy.
THEORIES
Scholarly literatures on climate policies and other environmental policies, both cross-
national and on the United States, have in common a bifurcation between structural and process
theories. 9 One theoretical strand has emphasized the presence or absence of certain structural
barriers to climate policy making. The first of these is the fragmentation of governmental authority,
such as in presidential rather than parliamentary systems and in systems with strong independent
judiciaries, which is held to make vigorous government intervention on the climate change issue
unlikely or impossible.10 Second, pluralist interest group systems, in contrast to neocorporatism,
have encouraged business groups to take an adversarial attitude toward environmental regulation
since the 1980s, and hence those groups have resisted climate policy.11 Fragmented authority and
pluralism each increases the number of veto points at which powerful producer interests can block
climate policies.12 Third, climate policies are less likely if the dominant ideology is economic
liberalism and hence is generally hostile to government intervention.13
Finally, the structural theories also posit the importance of the composition of the energy
sector. If a country or state is a net fossil fuel importer, it will favor climate policies, which tend to
reduce fossil fuel consumption, since these policies reduce its dependence on potentially unstable
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external energy supplies and also reduce its payments for them. Conversely, jurisdictions with large
domestic fossil fuel supplies will oppose climate policies since they lack those energy-security and
financial motivations, and also because they have powerful domestic interest groups favoring fossil
fuel use.14
According to the structural theories of climate policies, the weakness of the United States’
national climate policies is an inevitable result of these major barriers.15 The United States has a
presidential system with exceptionally fragmented authority (including an unusually strong upper
chamber of Congress and independent federal courts), a highly pluralist interest group system, a
large domestic fossil fuel industry, and a political culture marked by economic liberalism. These
structural features have allowed business and fossil fuel interests to promote the denial of climate
change science, persuade Congress to block climate legislation, and limit executive regulatory
action through threatened or actual litigation.
Yet there are several problems with the structural theories. They imply that significant
climate policies are not possible in the United States, given its structural disadvantages; political
actors appear to have no room to maneuver. But in fact some states have adopted relatively strong
climate policies, as will be detailed below, and sometimes even the federal government has done so.
For example, under pressure from state governments, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) opened the door for the federal EPA during the Obama administration
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, power plants, and other sources on the
basis of the Clean Air Act, without additional congressional legislation.16 Another weakness in the
structural account is that research seldom evaluates structural factors alongside political process
variables, partly because in large-N studies it is difficult to get comparable, reliable data on the
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latter.
Process theories of climate policy making offer an alternative that can help to explain why
some state governments in the United States have adopted strong climate policies despite
unfavorable structural features. State-level studies indicate several conditions under which actors
can influence climate policy adoption. First, the studies find that focusing events may raise
awareness of climate change issues, spur political commitment, and neutralize business opposition.
Such events include fossil fuel price increases or supply disruptions, and environmental disasters
such as storms, wildfires, or drought; the publication of new scientific findings can have similar
effects.17 Second, leadership by politically ambitious state-level elected officials, such as governors
or attorneys general, as well as by directors of state government agencies, can be an important
driver of climate policies.18 Third, advocates’ use of appropriate framing processes may ease the
acceptance of climate policies, by interpreting a region as ecologically vulnerable or emphasizing
the policies’ co-benefits for economic development, energy security, or air-pollution control.19
In seeking a comprehensive, coherent theoretical framework that can subsume the above
process variables as well as others, I decided to use Kingdon’s windows of opportunity theory of
agenda setting and policy making,20 for several reasons. First, an initial examination of cases of
state-level climate policy adoption showed that major policy changes clustered in relatively brief
episodes that alternated with longer periods of stability. The windows of opportunity theory
attempts to identify and explain moments of unusual openness, when policies that are usually stable
may change rapidly; in this regard, it is similar to punctuated equilibrium theory.21 Second, unlike
the latter theory, it includes prominent roles for external focusing events and changes in scientific
knowledge, which have been important in case studies of climate policy adoption. More generally,
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Kingdon’s theory aims to identify the factors that trigger instability in the policy system; like the
structural theories, it seeks to explain why, rather than merely how, change occurs.
In Kingdon’s theory, an issue is most likely to reach officials’ decision-making agenda
when intense problem awareness, viable policy solutions, and strong political commitment
converge. Each of these elements is affected both favorably and adversely by streams of events and
other processes, which are largely independent of each other. When problem and political streams
converge to produce the perception of a severe, urgent problem and also the political commitment
to address it, a policy window is created. The window may be exploited by policy entrepreneurs
who promote particular policy solutions, which already have been generated and tested in their own
complex, slow-moving stream.22
Here I will focus on how the problem and political streams create policy windows, and
leave aside the policy stream. Doing so will simplify this article’s comparative case-study analysis
and provide a somewhat tougher test of process theory, since policy streams are those most
amenable to influence by political actors. Moreover, it is unlikely that climate policy development
in California and New York was constrained by a lack of available, acceptable policy solutions. A
large number of climate policy instruments were developed by the late 1990s and had been tried out
in a number of states.23 Many of these instruments meet basic requirements of technical feasibility,
fit in with dominant values, are workable in budgetary terms, and have been widely communicated
to policy communities across the United States. In addition, states like California and New York,
due to their size and geographic proximity to other leading states, likely have had good access to
information about policy proposals.
The problem stream concerns which problems are seen as most important and hence worth
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putting on policy makers’ decision-making agendas. The problem stream can be altered
significantly through extraordinary focusing events, dramatic information about indicators of
environmental conditions, and feedback from existing policies.24 The political stream concerns
who holds power, their ideological or value-based commitments, and the political constraints they
face or anticipate. This stream is affected by election results, changes in governmental leadership
positions, shifts in public opinion, and mobilization by organized groups.25
While the theory of policy windows was initially formulated to explain how issues get onto
the agenda and become ripe for action by policy makers, it has also been used to explain policy
adoption.26 Nonetheless, to use the policy windows theory for this purpose, it is helpful to
supplement it with aspects of advocacy coalition theory, in order to capture the role of interest
groups in the policy-making process and to help explain how the rise of an issue on the agenda
sometimes leads to policy change.27 The stream of political events affects not only the degree of
political commitment to an issue by elected officials, but also the balance of power between the
coalition of advocates for a policy direction and the coalition of their opponents. Both kinds of
coalition can draw on specialists in a variety of governmental and private organizations, including
government agencies, political parties, legislatures, interest groups, non-profit organizations, social
movement organizations, research institutions, and media outlets.28
To summarize the process theory used here, when problem and political streams converge,
they open a policy window. At such times, if the advocacy coalition is more powerful and mobilizes
more energetically and wisely than the opposition coalition, new or strengthened climate policies
will be adopted.
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CASE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Case study comparisons are well suited for capturing process variables and linking them to
outcomes.29 The two states analyzed in this article initially were selected simply in order to
construct a universalizing comparison of two cases with climate policies that were clearly relatively
strong in the U.S. context.  I also wanted to choose states that were inherently important because
they were large enough and were leaders rather than followers in their regions; the latter feature has
the added advantage of making their climate policy making large independent of other states’
politics and hence reducing the number of explanatory factors to be considered.  In addition,
however, since one of the cases is California, and it proved to have by far the strongest climate
policies of all the U.S. states, this afforded the opportunity to conduct a second kind of comparative
analysis – a variation-finding comparison that explains why California’s policies are notably
stronger than New York’s.
Hence, there were three reasons for choosing these two states. First and foremost, compared
with other U.S. states, California and New York have adopted advanced climate policies. Every
year since 2008, both have ranked among the top five U.S. states in the rankings published by the
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, which are based on counts of about two dozen different
state-level climate policies concerning electricity generation, buildings, and transportation, as well
as cross-cutting measures such as greenhouse gas targets and registries.30 While useful for
identifying the strongest cases in the United States, the rankings do not capture another salient fact:
California is the pre-eminent example of state-level climate policy in the United States.  It is the
only state with legally binding, economy-wide emissions targets, and these are enforced by a state
agency (the Air Resources Board) with the largest administrative capacity and broadest policy
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portfolio of any similar state-level agency. As Barry Rabe, the leading expert on state-level climate
policies, put it, “California has surpassed every other U.S. state in the sheer range of climate
policies enacted and the boldness of its overall emissions reduction plan.”31
Second, both states have been leaders, influencing other states or the federal government.
For example, California has spearheaded a coalition of states promoting electric and hybrid vehicles
and greenhouse gas emissions standards for cars, which led to the federal government adopting
regulations on the latter during the Obama administration. New York State was the leading force in
creating the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, an emissions trading system for electric utilities in
the Northeast. 32
Third, these are also important cases in the U.S. and even the global context. If California
were an independent country, its GDP, approximately $2.0 trillion in 2012, would make it the 10th
largest in the world, about the same as Italy, Russia, India, or Canada. Its population of about 37
million would place it 35th, about the size of Poland or Canada. Its greenhouse gas emissions,
around 440 megatons CO2-equivalent in 2010, would make it the world’s 19th largest emitter,
similar to France or South Africa.33 New York State is not far behind California on these
dimensions. Worldwide, it would rank about 14th in GDP, 60th in population, and 38th in
emissions if it were an independent country.
CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK’S CLIMATE POLICIES
In this section, I will briefly summarize these two states’ climate policies in order to show
that both have relatively strong policies, and that California’s are more ambitious and stringent than
New York’s.  I will also show that the adoption of their main policies was concentrated in several
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episodes: during 2002 and 2006-2008 in California, and during 2002-2003 and 2007-2010 in New
York.
Both states adopted greenhouse gas emissions targets and emissions trading systems in the
2000s. While New York’s targets are nominally more ambitious, California’s actually require
greater reductions relative to business-as-usual scenarios. California adopted ambitious greenhouse
gas reduction targets in the Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32) in 2006. AB 32 legally requires
and authorizes a state agency, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to achieve a target of no
growth from 1990 to 2020 in the Kyoto-regulated gases from all significant sources, including
electricity imports. This target is more ambitious than it appears, since it requires a cut of 15 percent
from 2006 emissions and of 29 percent from the business-as-usual scenario, given the state’s actual
and projected rapid population growth during the 1990-2020 period.34
For its part, New York officially adopted a greenhouse gas emissions target four years
before California, in June 2002, when Governor George Pataki released a comprehensive energy
plan drawn up by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA).
The plan set a goal of reducing emissions 5 percent from 1990 to 2010 and 10 percent by 2020.35
Since emissions had already risen 12 percent from 1990 to 2000, this means a reduction of 20
percent from the 2000 emissions rate will be needed over the next 20 years. An estimate of the
targeted reductions relative to a business-as-usual scenario is not available.  However, New York’s
population growth rate, which totaled 10 percent over 1990-2015, is much slower than California’s
31 percent increase in that period.  Hence, I estimate that the per-capita reductions in emissions
required by the statewide targets in New York will be only about 20 percent over the 1990-2020
period, compared with about 27 percent in California.36
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While New York also adopted emissions trading earlier than California, the latter’s system
is much larger in scope and has required steeper declines in emissions than New York’s. To help
implement its 10 percent reduction goal, New York State spurred the establishment of the first
greenhouse gas emissions trading system in the United States, the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI), which covers CO2 emissions from electricity generation. In 2003, Governor
Pataki invited the governors of Northeastern states to participate in the system, which went into
effect in 2009, with ten states participating (although New Jersey withdrew in 2011). However, in
California, CARB created a much broader cap-and-trade program to help implement AB 32, which
took effect in 2013 for large industrial facilities and electric utilities and in 2015 for distributors of
transportation and heating fuels.37 Since RGGI is limited to electricity generation, it includes only
27 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions in New York State,38 but CARB’s system covers 85
percent of California’s emissions. While RGGI was designed to reduce emissions by 10 percent
over its first 10 years, the cap in CARB’s system was set to decline much more steeply, by 19
percent over its first 7 years.39
In both states, a wide range of sectoral policies supports greenhouse gas reduction targets.40
In California, these include an electricity performance standard adopted in 2006, requiring new
power plants or import agreements to not exceed the carbon emissions of a combined-cycle natural
gas plant; New York followed suit in 2012. Energy efficiency gained a renewed focus in New York
in 2007 when Governor Spitzer announced a goal of reducing electricity consumption by 15 percent
below the business-as-usual level in 2015 (the “15 by 15” initiative).41 This was implemented the
next year when the Public Service Commission established an energy efficiency portfolio standard
to implement this goal, with three-year interim targets, incentives for utilities, and a system benefits
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charge that provides funds to the utilities.42
California’s renewable energy policies have made it a national leader in that area since the
late 1970s. Although its generous tax credits and feed-in tariffs adopted in the 1976-1982 period
were discontinued in the mid-1980s, new legislation has supported the industry since 2000, when
the large utilities were required to collect $1.35 billion from ratepayers over the next ten years to
subsidize renewable energy.43 Moreover, the legislature adopted an ambitious renewable portfolio
standard in 2002 (revised in 2006 and 2011), ultimately calling for 20 percent of the state’s
electricity to come from renewable sources by 2013, and 33 percent by 2020. A large solar
initiative, the “million roofs” program, committed $3 billion in funding for residential installations
in 2006, at the time the second largest solar program in the world, after Germany’s.44 By 2015,
about 30 percent of electricity generated in California was from renewable sources, including 23
percent from solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass. 45
By contrast, although it has large hydropower resources, New York developed very little
new renewable energy before the 2000s. However, since 2000, New York has adopted more
supportive policies, including state purchasing of renewable energy, research and development
funding, and a renewable portfolio standard. The latter was adopted in 2002 and later, in 2010,
accelerated to a goal of 30 percent renewable energy (including hydropower, which provides about
19 percent of consumption) by 2015.46 These policies have helped New York become a regional
leader in wind power, with 1638 Megawatts installed by the end of 2012, generating about 2
percent of the state’s electricity demand.47 However, on the whole, California’s targets for new
renewable energy sources are more ambitious than New York’s, according to comparative studies
of the stringency of such targets, and California is also closer to meeting its goals.48
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In the transportation sector, California has been a national leader, due partly to its right to
initiate tougher standards under the federal Clean Air Act. The California legislature passed the
pathbreaking Pavley bill in 2002, which directed CARB to develop greenhouse gas emissions
standards for cars that would reduce emissions per mile by 37 percent for cars and 24 percent for
trucks over the 2009-2016 period.49 With 17 other states intending to join it, the new standard was
blocked by carmakers’ lawsuits and by the EPA in 2008, before ultimately being permitted by an
EPA ruling in June 2009. Moreover, the Pavley standard was effectively implemented nationwide
through an agreement between the Obama administration and ten global carmakers in 2009, which
required them to cut vehicles’ CO2 emissions per mile by 30 percent in 2016.
50 California also has
tried to spur the development of all-electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles through regulatory
mandates in its zero-emission vehicle program, and it adopted a low carbon fuel standard for road
fuels in 2007 and a transportation planning law with greenhouse gas reduction targets in 2008.51
For the most part, New York’s policies on motor vehicle pollution and energy efficiency
have followed California’s. New York announced in 2003 that it would adopt California’s CO2
emission standards for motor vehicles, and it also adopted California’s zero-emission vehicle
standards and goals in 1990 and 2013. However, New York has not adopted a low-carbon fuel
standard, and the efforts of eleven Northeastern states to develop one since 2010 have not yet borne
fruit.52
The descriptions in this section show that the adoption of major climate policies in
California and New York clustered in relatively short periods, which alternated with periods in
which major policies were not adopted. These clusters define four policy adoption episodes that
will be the focus of the analysis later in this article:
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 California’s adoption of standards for the emission of greenhouse gases by motor vehicles
and for renewable energy purchases by utilities (in 2002);
 California’s adoption of binding emissions reduction targets, the authorization of CARB
to implement them through emissions trading and other measures, the adoption of a low-
carbon fuel standard and an electricity performance standard, the tightening of the
renewable portfolio standard, the million roofs solar program, and the transportation
planning law (2006-2008);
 New York’s adoption of greenhouse gas emissions targets and a renewable portfolio
standard, and the initiation of RGGI (2002-2003);
 New York’s adoption of an energy efficiency initiatives and an energy efficiency portfolio
standard, and the tightening of its renewable portfolio standard (2007-2010).
Of course, implementation of these policies by state agencies occurred gradually, and during the
periods between the policy adoption episodes.  But the focus of this article is on explaining policy
adoption.
STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS OF CALIFORNIA’S AND NEW YORK’S POLICIES
Can the structural theories of climate policies, with their focus on political institutions and
socioeconomic structures, explain the degree to which California and New York have adopted
ambitious climate policies? According to the structural theories, when governmental authority is
unified and hence fewer veto points are available to opponents, strong climate and other
environmental policies are more likely. However, although U.S. states do vary somewhat in the
powers of their governors and the professionalization of their legislatures, neither California nor
New York has a political system with highly concentrated authority. Indeed, California has a
governmental system that is even more fragmented than those in most other U.S. states, including
New York. California has a highly plural rather than a unitary executive, currently with ten
statewide elected officials, who are frequently from different parties, conflict over policy, and even
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litigate against each other.53 In New York, by contrast, executive power is more concentrated in the
hands of the governor, who shares the stage only with the lieutenant governor, attorney general, and
state comptroller, a relatively small number compared with most states.
In several other ways, California’s governors have average institutional powers, while New
York’s are more powerful than average. Governors are limited to two four-year terms in California,
but there is no term limit in New York. The governor’s budgetary powers are co-equal with the
legislature’s in California, but the New York governor has a line-item veto. As a result, New York
ranked first among all states in the formal power of the governor in the late 1990s, with 4.3 points
on the 1-5 scale of Morehouse and Jewell; California scored only 3.2, slightly below average, in this
index.54
As is the case at the federal level, the executives in California and New York share power
with bicameral state legislatures. Moreover, the potential for conflict and deadlock between
governor and legislature is, if anything, even greater in these states than in the average U.S. state,
since their legislatures have unusually high capacities. Along with only eight other states, they both
have full-time legislatures, and on Squire’s legislative professionalism index, they ranked first and
second in the country.55
In addition, strong direct-democratic procedures in California further limit the executive, by
making governors subject to recall and diffusing the legislative power. Ballot initiatives (since
1911) and referendums are important methods of policy adoption and policy blockage in the state,
with about a dozen ballot measures voted on each year. New York is much more restrictive in terms
of direct democratic procedures, allowing only legislatively referred constitutional amendments and
averaging only two ballot measures per year since 1996.56
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In short, both states overcame fragmented government institutions to adopt climate policies.
Indeed, if fragmented government is a recipe for inaction on climate and environmental policy, then
California should have policies that are weaker than the average U.S. state. New York, though
showing signs of concentrated gubernatorial authority, still has a system where the governor must
contend with other statewide executive elected officials and a highly professional legislature.
A pluralist interest-group system is the second political-institutional feature that is
prominent in structural theories. The United States as a whole ranks quite high in pluralism, in
contrast to corporatism, whether in the context of economic or environmental policy making.57
California and New York show no signs of departing from the U.S. model. Their interest groups are
multiple and competitive, engage heavily in electoral politics through campaign finance, and
energetically lobby the legislature. In California, interest groups write over 60 percent of the bills
introduced in the legislature and are often in adversarial relationships with government, including
litigation.58 In New York, interest groups are also very numerous and spend much money on
lobbying; 3,600 registered groups spent $120 million in 2003. However, they are relatively
defensive in their lobbying and initiate only an estimated 20 percent of bills.59 Accordingly,
Thomas and Hrebenar classify California as a system with stronger power for interest groups than
New York.60
The rampant pluralism in California is evident in the climate policy arena, where public
utilities and the oil and gas industries were the third and fourth largest contributors to electoral
campaigns in 2008, totaling $60 million in spending.61 The Pavley bill was fought fiercely by oil
companies, car dealers, and conservative talk shows.62 Interest groups are also generally very active
in direct-democratic politics. AB 32 was targeted by the oil industry, which spent over $10 million
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in support of Proposition 23, an unsuccessful attempt to overturn the climate law in 2010.63 With
New York’s climate policy pursued mainly through executive rather than legislative action, the role
of interest groups has been less visible, but still important, in supporting and opposing gubernatorial
initiatives, as described in the case studies below.
Third, the structural theories argue that where the dominant ideology is opposed to state
intervention, climate policy is less likely. Indeed, this barrier is weaker in California and New York
than in most states, as their citizens have been more “liberal” (i.e., more supportive of government
intervention) than the average in the United States. The Berry index of citizen ideology, derived
from election results for congressional candidates, shows that California’s voters were more liberal
than the U.S. average during the 2000-2010 period.64 However, California is not extraordinarily
liberal on this measure when compared with the United States as a whole and it is less liberal than
New York. California ranked only 16th among all states, with scores 12 percent higher than the
national average, while New York ranked 7th, 34 percent above the national average. An alternative
measure of liberalness, using average presidential election voting for the Democratic candidate
during the 2000-2008 period, shows both states to be somewhat more liberal than the Berry index
does. California ranks 10th among all states, at 56 percent of the vote, while New York continues to
rank higher; it is in 4th place with an average 61 percent Democratic vote.65
Moreover, greater liberalism in general does not always directly translate into greater public
support for, or interest in, climate policy. In the 1998-2000 period, just before California’s 2002
episode of climate policy adoption, its residents were actually less supportive of environmental
policy than a U.S. sample, and only about as likely to assess global warming as a serious threat.66 
Moreover, in California, public interest in climate change was extremely low in the 1999-2002
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period, when less than 1 percent named it the most important environmental problem in the state;
public interest in the issue rose only beginning in 2006, after the governor and legislators called for
limits on greenhouse gas emissions.67
Finally, the energy sector is another structural feature that has been related to climate policy.
Peterson and Rose write that “the most progress in climate action plans has been in states that are
not major fossil energy producers or users.”68 New York fits this pattern well. While the state has a
small amount of natural gas production, which increased after 2000, it still ranked 22nd among all
states in that activity and 27th in crude oil production in 2013, and it has no coal mining.69 Hence,
New York State produced an average of only 1 million BTUs/person of fossil fuel energy per year
in the 1995-2000 period, compared with 174 million BTUs/person for the United States as a whole.
But California is an important exception to this generalization, since it is a major producer
of crude oil and refined petroleum products.70 The state had 16 percent of U.S. crude oil reserves,
with an estimated 3,389 million barrels, in 2006.71 In 2005, California had the third largest oil
production among U.S. states. It has had about 12 percent of U.S. oil production over the last three
decades, basically the same as its share of the U.S. population.72 Refineries are also major economic
actors in California; 11 percent of the nation’s refinery capacity was located there in 2011.73  Thus,
the California case is evidence against the structural thesis that large fossil fuel industries make
vigorous climate policy impossible because they give rise to political lobbies that promote fossil
fuel production and consumption and that block climate policy. Although California’s fossil fuel
industries are large enough to form formidable political actors, as noted in the above discussion of
pluralist interest group politics in the state, they have been largely unsuccessful in the climate policy
area.
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In sum, the structural factors considered here, with the exception of liberal citizen ideology
in both states and the weakness of the fossil fuel industry in New York, cannot help explain
California’s and New York’s climate policies. In addition, the differences between these two states
concerning the fragmentation of government, interest group pluralism, and fossil fuel production
would predict stronger climate policies in New York than in California, while the opposite is
actually the case. Political-process theories are needed to help explain why relatively strong climate
policies are found in these states, and why California’s are notably stronger than New York’s.
THE PROBLEM AGENDA AND THE POLITICAL AGENDA IN CALIFORNIA AND
NEW YORK
The policy windows theory holds that events in the problem stream help to put an issue on
the public agenda, which creates opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to put the issue on the
political decision-making agenda. Hence, to help explain episodes of climate policy adoption, I
began by examining when the global warming or climate change issue got onto the public agenda in
these two states. I measured public attention to the issue in California and New York State by
coverage in the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times, respectively. Figure 1 shows that the
two states experienced the same four peaks in public attention to climate change.74 While this
figure also show a fairly sustained increase in public attention to climate change after 2007, a
decline to a previous low level of attention is not required by the policy windows theory; what
matters is that there were clear peaks in public attention, which can be linked to episodes of policy
adoption. Moreover, other, national-level data sources, such as television reporting or public
opinion salience, show a decline to relatively low levels of public attention after 2009. 75 I focus
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here on newspaper reporting because the Los Angeles Times and New York Times provide state-
level data.
Sources:  see note 74.
According to Kingdon, public attention is driven by problem events, which include reports
about problem indicators, focusing events, and feedback from policies that are seen as inadequate.
Indeed, the first small peak in public awareness, during 1990-1992, resulted from scientific
announcements about the discovery of global warming (a kind of indicator report) and the political
responses to that discovery, including congressional hearings on the issue and the 1992 Rio
conference on the environment.76 By contrast, the second peak in 1997 was driven mainly by
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political developments, namely the international negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol, rather than
scientific discoveries.  In any case, in the 1990s the federal government was the focus of climate
policy, not the states, as Congress put attention on climate change as part of air pollution and energy
legislation, and the executive branch participated in the Rio conference and Kyoto negotiations.
A third peak in public attention, in 2001, was driven by President George W. Bush’s
rejection of the Kyoto Protocol that year, his retreat from his initial support for mandatory
greenhouse gas regulation, and the critical response to those moves by foreign and state
governments, as well as by climate policy advocates.77 Bush’s clear signal of federal inaction was a
kind of policy feedback. It indicated that the problem of global warming would only get more
severe in the coming years, which created a sense of urgency and increased the expected scope for
state-level policy making, leading many states to undertake climate-policy initiatives.78
Finally, public attention to climate change began rising in 2006 and reached a large peak
during 2007-2009. This rise in attention was due to a combination of focusing events – damaging
Atlantic hurricanes in 2005 (Wilma, Rita, and Katrina) – and political responses that were partly
related to them. These responses included campaigns by environmental organizations, which began
to embrace the climate change issue at this time, and rapid shifts in business and media positions
toward accepting rather than denying mainstream climate science.79
In sum, the climate change issue’s peaks on the public agenda since the late 1980s were
driven by a combination of changes in scientific knowledge, focusing events, feedback from the
federal government’s retreat from climate policy, and efforts by political actors to make climate
change more salient to the public.
The peaks in public attention during 2001 and 2007-2009 can help to explain the increase in
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attention to the issue by elected officials in both states, as shown in the next two figures. Figure 2
shows that the California state legislature increased its attention to global warming and climate
change to a small degree in its 2000-2001 session, and then to a much greater degree in its 2005-
2006 and later sessions.80 Similarly, in New York, notable increases in legislators’ attention to
climate change occurred in 2001-2002 and in 2007-2008 and later. These increases showed more
inertia than the increases in public attention, a pattern that other researchers have also identified. 81
Figure 3 shows that these states’ governors’ attention to climate change also increased,
though less predictably, in their annual State of the State addresses.82 California’s governors put
attention on the climate change issue in 2007 (Arnold Schwarzenegger) and in the 2012-2014
period (Jerry Brown); in addition, there was a large spike in attention to energy problems in 2001
under Gray Davis. In New York State, governors increased their attention to climate change, in fits
and starts, after 2003. The relatively poor correspondence between Figure 3 and the peaks in the
other figures may mean that governors’ State of the State speeches are not adequate for measuring
governors’ attention to particular issues.  For example, Schwarzenegger gave much attention to
climate change in several major speeches in 2005-2006, but not in his State of the State addresses in
those years. 83
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Sources:  see note 80.
FIGURE2
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Sources:  see note 82.
FIGURE 3
Governor's Agenda in California and New York:  Climate 
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These data on public and elite decision-making agendas generally support the policy
windows theory. Driven in large part by external focusing events and policy feedback, public and
elite attention to climate change clustered in two periods (2001 and 2007-2009) that roughly
correspond to the episodes in which major climate policies were adopted in California and New
York. In the case studies that follow, I will discuss how these and other, state-specific problem
events also helped to raise awareness of the climate change problem in California and New York.
POLICY WINDOWS IN CALIFORNIA
Motor Vehicle Emissions and Renewable Energy Policy in 2002
In the early 2000s, the problem and political streams converged in California and made it
possible for climate policy advocates to gain the passage of two pieces of major legislation in 2002:
the adoption of a new policy on CO2 emissions from motor vehicles (the Pavley bill, AB 1493); and
an ambitious renewable portfolio standard. In addition to the Bush administration’s retreat from the
Kyoto Protocol, two sets of events specific to the state raised public awareness of energy and global
warming problems in California at this time. First, the state experienced a major electricity crisis in
2000-2001, which resulted from partial deregulation and market manipulations by energy traders
and which led to high prices and blackouts.84 The dramatic electricity shortages had many political
consequences, including increased public and elite interest in the reliability of the state’s energy
supply, which paved the way for the adoption of a renewable portfolio standard that was justified in
terms of energy security and diversification.85 Since natural gas prices had also spiked during the
electricity crisis, policy makers sought to curb rather than increase natural gas consumption, and
hence turned to renewable energy rather than the construction of new gas-fired power plants.
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Second, the Union of Concerned Scientists had issued a report on the effects of global warming on
California’s ecosystems in 1999. Written by eleven top scientists, the report was widely distributed
to state agencies and played a large role in educating policy makers about climate change.86
At the same time, three political developments increased political commitment to act to
reduce the state’s greenhouse gas emissions. The first was the leadership of a new Assembly
member, Fran Pavley. She held hearings on AB 1493 throughout the state in order to counter
charges by oil companies, car dealerships, and the California Chamber of Commerce about the
bill’s economic impacts. These hearings were successful in winning over public opinion.87 Second,
environmental organizations mobilized strongly in support of AB 1493 and the renewable portfolio
standard bill. These included the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Bluewater Network (which
wrote the Pavley bill), the Sierra Club, and Vote Solar.88
Third, the proponents of both bills successfully framed them in terms of their co-benefits
and downplayed their economic costs. Although the Pavley bill was aimed at global warming, the
justifications for it included major emphases on air pollution and health. By contrast, the renewable
portfolio standard bill was justified mainly on the basis of energy security, with global warming
only an afterthought that was not even mentioned in the bill.89 Moreover, the Pavley bill required
cost-effective emissions reductions; that is, increases in new car prices borne by consumers were to
be paid for with savings in gasoline costs.90 Also, both bills called for delayed or gradual
implementation, which pushed most costs off to later years.
This framing strategy was effective, given public opinion at this time. Although climate
change was not a salient issue among the public, and newspaper editorials ignored or opposed
action on climate change, the public was very concerned about air pollution and electricity supply.91
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Hence, the advocates’ efforts to frame the bills in terms of those co-benefits succeeded in gaining
public and hence political support for the bills. A poll by the Public Policy Institute of California in
June 2002 showed massive (80 to 85 percent) public support for both bills when they were pending
in the legislature, including over 80 percent of Republicans and over 75 percent of sport utility
vehicle owners.92 The release of that survey prompted the initially hesitant Governor Davis to sign
the Pavley bill.93
Climate Policy to Cut Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 2006-2008
The next episode of major climate policy adoption in California began four years later,
when the AB 32, a low-carbon fuel standard, and a transportation planning law were adopted. 
These measures set greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets and providing for implementation
through a wide range of regulatory measures, including a cap-and-trade program. These dramatic
policy changes were made possible by the confluence of several developments in the problem and
political streams. Public awareness of climate change in California was spurred by national events –
the hurricanes, advocacy campaigns, and business and media shifts noted in the section on agendas
– but also by two sets of problem events specific to the state. First, natural disasters in California
during this period were linked to climate change. Major droughts in the Central Valley during the
2002-2003 and 2007-2009 periods triggered states of emergency, and concerns about drinking
water supplies arose due to reduced snowfall. Wildfires began to occur year-round (rather than for
the usual two months a year) beginning in 2003, which saw $2 billion in damage from over four
thousand fires.94
Second, the publication of major reports by expert bodies drew attention to climate change
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as a problem and to solutions that would build in part on existing strengths in the state’s policies.
The Union of Concerned Scientists published a new report on the impacts of climate change in
California, in both scientific and public versions, in 2004. This report was more detailed, with finer-
grained quantitative analysis, and had grimmer predictions concerning heat waves and water
shortages than the organization’s 1999 report had.95 The Union of Concerned Scientists succeeded
in creating a unified scientific voice on climate change in California, which gained much media
attention, shaped the climate debate in the state, and helped build support for the controversial
enacting regulations of the Pavley bill, which CARB issued in 2004.96 Moreover, a 2005 executive
order issued by Schwarzenegger created the California Climate Center, which ran a scenarios
exercise involving seventy scientists. It delivered a report on climate policy strategy to the
legislature and governor in March 2006, which influenced the passage of AB 32.97
At the same time, four developments increased the degree of political commitment for
climate policy adoption, and hence helped to create a window of opportunity for advocates. First,
Arnold Schwarzenegger, a Republican, was elected governor in October 2003; two years later, he
became strongly committed to climate policy, in contrast to his cautious Democratic predecessor,
Gray Davis. Schwarzenegger’s election was extraordinary; it came about through a recall of Davis,
only the second time in U.S. history that a governor has been removed in that way. Moreover, the
recall election procedure did not require a primary election, which made it possible for a relatively
moderate Republican such as Schwarzenegger to win. In his campaign, Schwarzenegger endorsed
enhanced climate policy measures, including an acceleration of the renewable portfolio standard
target, but then took little action during his first two years in office.98
However, Schwarzenegger’s political ambitions ultimately drove him to a stronger position
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on climate policy.99 With his 2006 re-election campaign pending in a liberal state, Schwarzenegger
sought to portray himself as a moderate Republican in contrast to President Bush, and climate
policy was an area where he could draw a sharp contrast to the president.100 But since Republicans
in the governor’s office and the California Chamber of Commerce resisted stronger climate policy,
Schwarzenegger did not call for emissions targets until June 2005, when he issued an executive
order that did so.
Second, advocacy campaigns by environmentalists and a rapidly growing acceptance of
climate change by news media in the mid-2000s helped to shift public opinion across the United
States, perhaps especially in California, which has a concentration of environmental organization
members that is almost double the national average.101 Although some national environmental
organizations had been active on global warming since the 1990s, others joined them in the early or
mid-2000s, and private foundations more than doubled their annual spending on climate and
energy issues to $120 million in 2006.102 In addition, major news media, including the San
Francisco Chronicle, shifted sharply away from climate change denial during 2004-2006.103 Al
Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth documentary, which was released in May 2006 and became a box-
office hit and a media sensation, had an especially strong impact on California officials. In one
study, almost every policymaker interviewed in the state mentioned the influence of the film on
public opinion and elected officials.104
As a result, public opinion in the United States shifted toward greater interest in climate
change, combined with high levels of support for specific policies.105 In California, energy (at 12
percent) and global warming (8 percent) became the second and third “most important
environmental issue[s]” named by respondents to open-ended questions in 2006, up from only 3
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percent and 1 percent, respectively, in 2003.106 The targets in Schwarzenegger’s 2005 executive
order (no growth in emissions from 1990 to 2020, an 80 percent decline by 2050) were supported
by a massive 65 to 19 percent margin in a poll the next year, while the Pavley law was supported by
an even larger 78 to 16 percent margin.107
Third, partly in response to public opinion, the Democrats in the state legislature, led again
by Fran Pavley, competed for votes by introducing AB 32, which embodied stronger climate
policies than Schwarzenegger initially had favored. Ultimately the two sides compromised to pass
the bill, with the Democrats getting CARB rather than the California Environmental Protection
Agency as the implementing agency and Schwarzenegger getting authority for the governor to delay
implementation if there were a “threat of significant economic harm.” Emissions trading (favored
by Schwarzenegger) was included, but only as one option for CARB to consider.108
Fourth, a very large and broad advocacy coalition for climate policy developed in California
by the mid-2000s, encompassing environmentalists, certain business sectors, labor unions,
newspapers, health advocacy organizations, and local governments.109 In a state with strong
environmental organizations and large high-technology and venture-capital sectors, the Natural
Resources Defense Council formed an important partnership with Silicon Valley businesses, called
Environmental Entrepreneurs, which lobbied for the Pavley bill and AB 32. The firms liked the
bills’ implications for renewable energy technology and electric vehicles, and argued that AB 32
would “stimulate innovation, efficiency, and economic benefits.”110 In addition, the Sierra Club
initiated a broad “blue-green alliance” with labor unions in 2006, calling for 1.6 million jobs in
renewable energy, and engaged in the 2006 gubernatorial election.111 When Schwarzenegger and
the legislature became deadlocked on AB 32, the Sacramento Bee and the Los Angeles Times
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pressed for passage.112 The advocacy coalition was strong enough to overcome the opposition to
AB 32 by much of business, including the state Chamber of Commerce and the Western States
Petroleum Association, and later to defeat a 2010 campaign sponsored by oil refineries to overturn
the law by referendum.113
POLICY WINDOWS IN NEW YORK
2002-2003: Pataki, Kyoto, Bush, and 9/11
New York State’s first burst of explicit climate policy adoption occurred because problem
events and political developments came together beginning in 2001 to create both a sense of
urgency about climate change and the political commitment to address it with climate and energy
policies. Although the problem events affected many states, in New York they led to major policy
changes because they coincided with Governor Pataki’s increasingly strong interest in
environmental protection and the development of a broad advocacy coalition of businesses and
environmental groups.
The first problem event was President Bush’s rejection, in March 2001, of U.S.
participation in the Kyoto Protocol. In June, three months after Bush’s announcement, Pataki made
his own: he issued an executive order requiring a 35 percent cut in energy use by state buildings and
the creation of a state Greenhouse Gas Task Force, which he charged with finding ways to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions and global warming.114  The task force’s recommendations led to the
adoption of emissions targets and the initiation of RGGI during the next two years.
Second, the Bush administration’s energy policy, announced in May 2001, and al-Qaeda’s
attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. on 11 September 2001 increased the salience of energy
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policy for national policymakers and the public during 2001-2002. The Bush administration’s
energy policy downplayed renewable energy and sought to increase U.S. fossil fuel supplies by
increasing oil and natural gas extraction and by building more pipelines. Pataki responded by taking
a different tack in his State of the State speech in January 2002, one intended to address both energy
security and climate change. He called for New York to develop renewable energy in order to
improve the environment and “reduce our dependence on imported foreign energy,” as well as
create jobs, diversify energy supplies, and increase security.115
This rising attention to the problem of climate change took place at a time when political
developments in New York State also favored action in this area. First, George Pataki, who was
personally interested in environmental protection and had a strong environmental record in previous
elected offices, had been re-elected governor in 1998.116 Pataki’s environmental appointees also
shared his orientation, including John Cahill, his closest aide, who was the Environmental
Commissioner from 1997 to 2001 and Pataki’s chief of staff from 2001 to 2007.117
Despite his environmental interests, Pataki’s record on environmental issues had been at
best mixed during the first half of his twelve years as governor. Similar to Schwarzenegger, Pataki
had aides who were divided between pro-environmental and anti-regulation camps, the latter
influenced by his political patron, Alphonse D’Amato. 118 However, Pataki’s desire to be re-elected
governor and later to run for president led him increasingly to emphasize environmental issues. As
a Republican governor pressing the legislature for spending cuts and tax cuts in a liberal state,
Pataki faced declining approval ratings. In 1996, he found that he could reverse the decline through
environmental initiatives, starting with a $1.5 billion environmental bond referendum that was
carefully crafted to appeal to a very wide range of interests through spending on sewer projects,
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landfills, and toxic waste cleanups throughout the state.119
After his re-election in 1998 by a 21 percent margin, Pataki was still a Republican governor
seeking spending cuts in a liberal state and needing to shore up his support. Moreover, the
Democrat Eliot Spitzer had been elected attorney general that year. Spitzer was a former prosecutor
and consumer rights lawyer, and Spitzer immediately began vigorous action against a variety of
polluters and became seen as a likely candidate for governor. Hence, Pataki found that he had to
compete with Spitzer for the support of environmentalists.120
Therefore, partly because of this competitive pressure, after the climate change issue rose in
the late 1990s and Bush turned his back on the Kyoto Protocol, Pataki seized on the issue to bolster
his reputation and environmental credentials with voters in New York. In January 2002, he
announced the renewable portfolio standard goals, and then pushed for their adoption by the Public
Service Commission and worked with regulators to ease siting constraints.121 Sometime after his
2002 re-election, Pataki set his sights on the White House, which may help to explain why he
announced the RGGI initiative in 2003 and, over the next two years, followed through to help
create a ten-state regional initiative.
The second source of political commitment to climate policy was the development of a
strong coalition of climate policy advocates, who came together in the early 2000s for several
reasons. In 1996, electricity industry restructuring in New York State led to altered incentives for
politicians and utilities. Utilities were forced to sell off their generating facilities and to purchase
power from independent power producers. With rate increases now largely determined by market
forces operating on wholesale electricity prices, elected officials paradoxically became more willing
to take action that would increase rates, as RGGI was expected to do. The utility side became
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divided between energy producers, who would be required to buy emissions allowances under
RGGI, and wires-only utility companies, which supported the auctioning of allowances, since the
revenue would help fund their existing energy efficiency programs.122
Moreover, environmental and consumer advocates joined with business associations to
support climate policy in the early 2000s. Environmental groups (the Natural Resources Defense
Council and the Pace Law School Energy Project) began working with wind power interests in the
Renewable Energy Technology and Environment Coalition to promote the renewable portfolio
standard, beginning in 2003. The main conflict between advocates and opponents concerned the
renewable portfolio standard, in which the advocacy coalition faced an opposing coalition of
industrial companies (Multiple Intervenors), which argued that the standard would increase costs
and reduce system reliability.123 The advocates prevailed in the Public Service Commission in
September 2004, after sixteen months of hearings involving over one hundred parties.124
Governor Pataki facilitated the formation of this advocacy coalition through stakeholder
consultation processes that his administration initiated. In June 1996, Pataki convened a key
meeting of the state’s leading environmental organizations, including the Environmental Defense
Fund, to get their support for the bond act, and within a week had also gained that of business and
labor organizations.125 Pataki also conducted broad stakeholder consultations for a 1997 agreement
to protect New York City’s upstate watershed, in a 1998 task force on Superfund sites, and for the
renewable portfolio standard and RGGI.126 Pataki’s Greenhouse Gas Task Force included four
members from industry, five from environmental organizations, and six from state government, and
the members of the renewable energy coalition overlapped with that group.127
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2007-2010: Democratic Governors and New National Opportunities
The next episode of climate policy adoption in New York included the adoption of new
energy efficiency initiatives and an energy efficiency portfolio standard, as well as a tightening of
the renewable portfolio standard. These policy changes, which markedly accelerated the state’s
climate policy, were driven by events in the problem stream, which put attention on the climate
change issue nationally and in New York, and by a political shift toward the Democratic Party,
which put people into office who appeared to be more strongly committed to policy change than
Pataki had been. Problem awareness was heightened by the national problem events of the mid-
2000s, described in the section on agenda changes: the intense Atlantic hurricane season of 2005,
the business and media shift toward accepting climate science and supporting climate policy, and
advocacy campaigns by environmental organizations.
At the same time that the problem stream was highlighting climate change, Democrats took
control of the New York State and federal governments. Nationally, Democrats after 2008 pursued
climate policy through the 2009 federal stimulus bill (which provided major funding for renewable
energy), attempts to pass cap-and-trade legislation, and EPA actions to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions in transportation and power generation. In New York State, a series of Democrats who
were committed to climate policy became governor, beginning with Eliot Spitzer, who won the
2006 governor’s election by a massive 69 to 29 percent margin. Spitzer had a strong record on
environmental protection and corporate regulation in his eight years as attorney general, including
as the lead plaintiff in a ten-state federal lawsuit against the EPA for failing to regulate CO2.
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Three months after taking office, Spitzer announced ambitious initiatives to cut energy
consumption by 2015, including appliance standards, building standards, conservation in state
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buildings, and an energy-efficiency target, and his first budget proposal included a new climate
change office and an increase in environmental agency staff.129 Spitzer also raised the renewable
energy target in the state’s renewable portfolio standard to 30 percent by 2015.130
When Spitzer resigned due to a sex scandal in March 2008, the lieutenant governor, David
Paterson, who was a veteran, liberal Democratic assemblyman, succeeded him and continued
Spitzer’s climate policy course during his three years in office. In his first State of the State speech,
Paterson repeated Spitzer’s calls for 15 percent in savings through energy efficiency and a 30
percent target for the renewable portfolio standard, and also called for the development of plug-in
hybrid vehicle industry in the state and the creation of an energy policy institute.131 Under Paterson,
the state government also adopted an energy efficiency portfolio standard to implement the goal of
a 15 percent reduction by 2015, set a long-term 80 percent reduction goal for greenhouse gas
emissions, tightened state building codes, and commissioned a 2010 climate action plan. 132
CONCLUSIONS
In sum, the California and New York cases provide more support for the windows of
opportunity approach than for the main structural theories; there is some scope for actors to make a
difference, despite the structural constraints. This is evident in explaining both why these two
states have strong climate policies and why California’s are stronger than New York’s.  The main
structural barriers advanced in the literature, including fragmented government authority, a pluralist
interest group system, and (in California) a large fossil-fuel industry did not prevent the adoption of
relatively strong climate policies in these states. In fact, the separation of powers appears to have
facilitated climate policy making indirectly, by creating multiple pathways for state-level advocates
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(through the legislature or the governor) and by laying the institutional groundwork for competition
between actors seeking public support on a popular issue (e.g., Schwarzenegger vs. Pavley, Pataki
vs. Attorney General Spitzer). Klyza and Sousa argue that the separation of powers has these effects
in many areas of national environmental policy making.133 It also did so in national climate policy,
where, facing the intransigence of the Bush administration and congressional gridlock, advocates
turned to state governments and the federal courts. This led to the Supreme Court’s Massachusetts
v. EPA decision, which made it possible for the Obama administration to pursue greenhouse gas
regulation through the EPA, without new congressional legislation.134
Nonetheless, structures do affect what political actors can achieve. Some structural features
were underlying causes of policy adoption in California and New York, as I have described in more
detail elsewhere.135 Both states have relatively well-educated, liberal populations and high
memberships in environmental organizations per capita. Moreover, both had severe air pollution
problems in the 1960s, and by the 1970s they had created large agencies to regulate air pollution
and energy, which played key roles in climate policy adoption and implementation in the 2000s;
hence, there is a degree of path dependence in their climate policy making.136 In particular, CARB’s
large, science-based administrative capacities and its independence from the legislature have helped
it to implement the most far-reaching climate policies in the country.137
In addition, the federal Clean Air Act has made it possible for California to take a leading
role in some important areas of climate policy. Since 1967, federal law has given California the
right to apply for exemptions from federal motor vehicle air pollution standards in order to adopt its
own stricter standards, and since 1977 it has given other states the right to adopt California’s rules if
they choose. These legal rights formed the basis for California’s leading role in promoting electric
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and hybrid vehicles and in regulating greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.138
For its part, the windows of opportunity theory generally is well supported by the case
studies of climate policy adoption in California and New York. The evidence offered in this article
includes the quantitative measures of changes in public and elite agendas, the identification of
problem and political events that plausibly drive those changes, and, in the narrative sections, the
mechanisms that link those events to each of the four episodes of policy adoption. In each of those
episodes, the convergence of problem events and political events – by enhancing awareness of the
problem of climate change and political commitment to adopt mitigation policies – created
relatively brief periods of openness that could lead to major policy change. In California, the
electricity crisis of 2000-2001, drought and wildfires, scientific reports, Pavley’s leadership,
mobilization by environmental organizations, Schwarzenegger’s election, and his strategic shift
toward the climate issue came together to produce major policies in two different episodes. In New
York State’s two policy adoption episodes, the convergences involved Pataki’s election and his turn
toward environmental issues, mobilization by a broad coalition of climate-policy advocates, and the
election of Spitzer to the governorship in 2006, at a time of peak public interest in climate change.
In both states, the Kyoto process and Bush’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol were important in
raising attention to the issue. Also, in both states, the shift by the mass media and parts of business
toward support for climate policy created a more favorable political context for climate policy, as
did the increasing capacity and activity on this issue by specialized state agencies that had been
created by the 1970s: CARB, the California Energy Commission, the California Public Utility
Commission, and NYSERDA.
Generally, problems, politics, and solutions came together to create windows of opportunity
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that were used by legislators such as Pavley, by governors (such as Schwarzenegger, Pataki, and
Spitzer), and by others in the governors’ administrations to advance key policies at the four critical
junctures analyzed in the case studies. However, the policy adoption episodes are longer than one
might expect from Kingdon’s theory. This may be due in part to the persistence, in the climate
change issue area, of high levels of public attention, elite attention, and political commitment by
elected officials, especially in the period beginning in 2006 (See Figures 1-2 above).
Political and problem events also can help to explain why New York’s climate policies have
been weaker than California’s, especially in the areas of enforceable targets, emissions trading, and
low-carbon fuel standards. First, Pataki was not spurred by competition from a legislature that was
active on the issue. He did have competition from the New York attorney general, but in that role
Spitzer could not pass his own proposals on state buildings, the renewable portfolio standard, or
RGGI; he could not force Pataki to negotiate over climate policy, as the Democrats in the California
legislature did with Schwarzenegger. With the 1996 environmental bond referendum, Pataki
effectively circumvented the legislature, and he continued to do so with his climate policy
initiatives. But there are legal and political limits to what the governor can do on his own, even in
New York State; legally binding targets and a comprehensive emissions trading system such as
those adopted in California probably would require legislative approval. The executive branch
strategy chosen by Pataki resulted in less conflict over climate policy than in California, but
ultimately perhaps in less public and legislative support and certainly in a weaker policy overall.
Schwarzenegger, on the other hand, was unable to overcome or evade the legislature in his
first years in office, although he tried. After losing on four major ballot measures that he had
proposed in 2005, Schwarzenegger then shifted strategy toward working with the legislature on
41
climate policy. If Schwarzenegger had chosen to implement his climate policy through executive
orders and actions by CARB and the California Environmental Protection Agency rather than
through legislation, California’s policy would probably resemble New York’s, without enforceable
targets or an economy-wide cap-and-trade system.
Second, New York’s problems related to climate and energy policy were smaller and the
perception of them in the early 2000s were less intense and urgent than were California’s. There
was no major electricity crisis in the wake of deregulation in New York, and no major report on
climate change impacts in New York State until 2011, twelve years after the first report by the
Union of Concerned Scientists in California. Other relevant problem events were about equally
large, but different in the two states: California had droughts, wildfires, and a large,
environmentally vulnerable agricultural sector, while New York had an electricity blackout of a
major urban area in 2003 and the unique event of the 9/11 attacks. Moreover, the weakness of
legislative involvement made the impacts of focusing events less important in New York, because
the causal path from public attention on such events to policy adoption was also less important
there than in California.
However, climate policy adoption is not simply a story of political responses to the
emergence of concentrated costs in the form of climate change impacts such as drought or storms,
due ultimately to the size of ecological vulnerabilities. Growing scientific knowledge and certain
kinds of weather events may highlight the threats of climate change, but for attention and concern to
translate into policies designed to mitigate climate change, appropriate framing and political
commitment is also required – partly because the costs of climate change are probabilistic,
uncertain, temporally distant, and controversial. Hence, the strong Atlantic hurricanes of 2005
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sparked climate policy efforts in the Northeast and on the West Coast, rather than in the Gulf Coast
states that have the largest hurricane risks and were most affected by those storms. On the other
hand, windows for climate policy could be created by problem events, such as the California
electricity crisis or the 9/11 attacks in New York, that were not directly related to climate change
but could be used by committed actors to justify climate policy.
This analysis of the California and New York cases suggests that some revisions to theories
of climate policy are needed. Strong climate policy does not require one particular set of
institutional and economic factors. Strengths in political processes sometimes can overcome the
structural barriers found in the United States, and political actors at times have significant room to
maneuver. Unified governmental authority is not necessary if specialized administrative agencies
have been created, election results put committed leadership into positions of power, and societal
coalitions become broad enough. Corporatism and strong ecological parties are not necessary if the
pluralist interest group system comes to have a strong environmental component. Indeed, the
fragmentation of authority in the United States sometimes gives climate policy proponents
additional opportunities, such as when blockage by the Bush administration at the federal level led
to state-level policy adoption or when the California legislature and governor competed to press for
a stronger climate policy there.
At the same time, the policy windows theory overstates the independence of problem events
and political events in the climate policy domain.139 Political events and actors strongly influenced
problem perception in the cases analyzed here. For example, in California in the early 2000s,
influential scientific reports on climate change impacts were produced by a political actor, the
Union of Concerned Scientists. Also, the sharp and sustained rise of the global warming issue on
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public and political agendas in both states after 2005 owes more to political mobilization by
environmentalists and to shifts in position by business corporations and the news media than to
changes in the objective problem or in scientists’ understanding of it. Thus, politics potentially
permeates the problem stream, rather than the problem stream being an objective, separate set of
events. This is good news for climate policy advocates. They can help to create their own
opportunities, by trying to affect both problem perception and political commitment, rather than
needing to wait for extraordinary problem events to occur.
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